

BRITISH PERSPECTIVE ON HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION 1956

Original scientific paper
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The Hungarian Revolution caught unprepared Western powers preoccupied with the Suez crisis. The clashes between the Soviets and the Hungarians were the first, ever armed conflict between communist countries in Europe. The British position in the Hungarian Revolution 1956, as well as the French and American one, was based on the intent not to provoke the Soviet Union. Although British officials gave assurances they would not interfere in the Hungarian crisis, diplomatic sources evidently demonstrate that those events were very important for them. After the collapse of the Imre Nagy government and the Revolution the British primary focus was not to allow Soviets and Kadar's government to hide persecutions and humanitarian crisis that marked Hungary in the post-revolution period. The paper is based on the unpublished diplomatic reports of British diplomats in Budapest, Vienna, Moscow and New York, kept in the Foreign Office collections of the National Archives in London.

Key words: Hungarian Revolution, Imre Nagy, British, 1956, United Nations, Foreign Office.

*T*HE EVENTS OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION were among the most important turning points in the early stage of the Cold War and the reactions of Western powers to the events of 1956 proved to be a good example of later inertia and restrained attitude until the last stage of the Cold War.

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After events of October – November there were no doubts that the Cold War would be both protracted and bitter, with hostile armies facing each other across the divided Europe (Kissinger, 2006, 16).

The case of Great Britain and its attitude in those turbulent days is very hard to understand without taking into account the Suez crisis where both Great Britain and France were involved. The interests of both countries were to maintain good relations with Soviet Union and not to allow Soviets to be accused for exploiting the events taking place in Hungary (Bekes 2006, 502). Both British and French governments were caught unprepared by the developments in Hungary. French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau gave a report to the media on the crucial 26th October that France wouldn't intervene in Hungary (Bekes 2006, 502–503). Both French and British attitude was that they didn't want to be accused by Moscow that they are to be blamed for the beginning of the Hungarian Revolution. British stance was very similar to the French one as two nations had a similar challenges waiting for them in Egypt. Days before the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution, Great Britain and France were engaged in negotiation with Israelis at the negotiation held in Sevres where they master planned the attack on Suez and Sinai.

American government was equally unprepared as British and French were when the events in Hungary broke out. On the October 26th the National Security Council, highest level advisory body, met for the first and the last time during the Hungarian Revolution. The result was the acceptance of the proposal made by Harold E. Stassen, the president's adviser on disarmament. His first suggestion was modified, and according to the revised plan, the US should either through Tito or through some other diplomatic channel attempt to convince the Soviets that a zone of strictly neutral, non-NATO countries, like Austria, would offer them as much security as satellite countries of the Warsaw pact (Bekes 1997, 500–501). The importance of this was that Americans stated that they don't look upon those satellite nations as potential military allies. That was the State Department position in their European policy until the end of the Cold War (Bekes 2006, 499).

Similar to the British and the French, the Americans were also more occupied with the situation in the Middle East. That's why their focus was on Egypt during the first few days of November and only the Soviet attack on Hungary on 4th November had alarmed them. However, they concluded that they had no means
76 | of exerting its influence in the Soviet sphere of influence (Bekes 2006, 500).

The beginning of the Revolution in Hungary was looking less violent than the June riots in Poznan. However, public demonstrations on 24th October turned into full-blown uprising. The success of Wladyslaw Gomulka as Party leader in Poland, in the opposition to the Post Stalinist Soviet leadership, made a strong message to Hungarians. Momentum for the demonstration in Budapest was initially set by the demonstrations and demands made by students in Szeged (Rainer 2006, 246). Their actions made a chain reaction in other university cities across Hungary, which led to the student assembly at the Budapest Technical University on 22nd October. As students were unsuccessful in their wish to present their demands on the radio and decided to take to the streets on next day (23rd October). Their most important goals were: the departure of the Soviet troops from Hungary, a multi-party political system, the freedom of the opinion and the press, the removal of the Stalin statue and the new government. They also had very pragmatic demands, such as freedom of Hungary to sell its uranium to whomever they would prefer for the market price.¹ Two major factors motivated the demonstrations: they wanted to present their demands and to show their sympathy for the Polish reforms (Horvath 2006, 266–269). Hungarian Party leaders didn't seem to have been prepared for the demonstrations that changed its character from the students' demonstration into large scale civil protest. Imre Nagy addressed demonstrators on 23rd from the Parliament building in quite despondent way that disappointed the crowd. The open rebellion on the 24th couldn't be stopped even by the newly appointed Prime Minister Imre Nagy. Fights that broke on that day led to victory of the demonstrators, Soviet suffered their first casualties and loss of tanks and artillery in an East European capital since 1945. By the end of the month it looked like the Revolution was about to achieve its aims. On 28th October Imre Nagy announced the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Hungarian Secret Police (The AVO - Allamvedelmi Osztaly) was disbanded, an amnesty was announced for participants of the Revolution, the coat-of-arms from the Rakosi regime was replaced by the Kossuth coat-of-arm that was seen as the nationalistic by the communist in the postwar Hungary. The National holiday was restored at 15th of March. Just few days later, on 1st November Prime Minister Imre Nagy declared that Hungary was an independent and neutral state, something that Gomulka never did. The Soviet reaction was felt on 4th November with the full scale attack on Budapest that marked the beginning of the end of the 1956 Revolution.

1 http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/news_1956_16Points.html

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Still, by reading intelligence reports from Foreign Office in London and embassies and delegations in Budapest, Belgrade, Vienna, Washington, Moscow and Rome, it is clear that British were watching very closely all developments of Hungarian Revolution and that the humanitarian crisis was among their most important concerns. Their attitude towards the situation in Hungary, according to the sources available for this paper, were closest to the French one and were not necessary similar to the stance of the State Department.

The British mission was worried very early about the humanitarian crisis, and already by 28th October the Foreign Office sent the request to the embassy in Vienna to start collecting medical supplies for the Hungarian Red Cross.² In the early afternoon hours of 28th October 1956, we can trace the hope for the ceasefire between the Hungarian side and the Soviet troops in the text of the appeal made by three Western ambassadors. Austrians were already prepared by 26th October for the Hungarian frontier crossers and their actions were to follow Geneva Conventions, so any unarmed individual would be given asylum.³

Austrians furthermore organized the transport for the prospective asylum seekers from the border area. They were also preparing with the Red Cross International for the Hungarians fleeing to Austria. Even that early on, British representatives were asked if they could host some of the refugees.⁴ One of the main concern of British delegation was distribution of the relief supplies though the Red Cross and with strong cooperation with Austrians that were present in Hungary already in the last days of October. The top concern was regarding medical equipment and drugs.⁵ The British organized the first Convoy of the humanitarian aid on 2nd November, after the first option of sending it by plane from Vienna to Budapest was abandoned, since Soviets were controlling the airport, so the trans-

2 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 28th October 1956 to Vienna embassy.

3 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Vienna 28th October 1956 Sir G. Wallinger to Foreign office and Whitehall.

4 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Vienna 28th October 1956 Sir G. Wallinger to Foreign office and Whitehall.

5 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Vienna 1st November 1956 Sir G. Wallinger to Foreign office and Whitehall.

port started its journey by land with as many as possible Union Jack flags hanged on lorries.⁶

In the report from North Atlantic council we can see the complexity of the situation in Hungary, since after the first fights started there was little hope that Imre Nagy was in control of situation, and it looked like none of the fighting sides trusted him. His position as well as the position of the Communist party in Hungary was completely opposite of the Gomulka's one in Poland. Polish scenario saw that the national emotion was channeled in his support, rather than against him.

Even one week after the start of escalation it seemed there was not much possibility for a compromise because Hungarian nationalists didn't want to lay down their weapons as long as Soviet troops were in Hungary. At the same time, it was concluded that Soviets most likely won't allow weakening of their position in satellite states by withdrawing from Hungary.⁷

NATO had made very swift reaction to ongoing process in Hungary: Governments of NATO members made appeal to the UN Security Council to consider the situation in Hungary. Appeal to the Soviet Government was focused on three key requests: to order its troops to cease all offensive actions in Hungary; halt further troop movement in Hungary and agree to the withdrawal of all troops from Hungary as soon as the situation permits. It was very important for the NATO to at least offer to Soviets some kind of assurance that the NATO won't establish any kind of military ties with Hungarian Government and that the best future model for Hungary would be the Austrian model of neutrality. NATO forces would use its bases in Germany and Italy only for offering and distribution of medical supplies, ambulances, doctors, nurses, food and any other humanitarian aid for the benefit of all Hungarians. All NATO Governments were encouraged to do whatever they can to mobilize world public and make an avalanche of telegrams to Moscow to make as much pressure as possible to stop further Soviet intervention.⁸ – 27/10

The 31st October was the point of no return, as correspondence of foreign diplomats in the UN made it clear that the future of Hungary was very uncertain. Hungarian representative in the UN Mr. Koss had the opportunity to address Se-

6 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 1s November 1956 to Foreign office and Whitehall.

7 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Paris 27th October 1956 to Foreign office.

8 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Paris 27th October 1956 to Foreign office.

curity Council although Mr. Sobolev (USSR) was against it and Mr. Brilej (Yugoslavia) abstained during the vote, other nine votes were in favor to give the floor to Mr. Koss.⁹

Soviet representative remained isolated as all the Security Council members accused Soviets of opening fire against Hungarian nationalists and stated that there was no justification for that. His reply was focused on suppressing of peoples' rights in Algeria, Cypress and Singapore. Mr. Sobolev tried to accuse Americans and British of plotting against Soviets in Hungary. Through the insight into diplomatic correspondence of Foreign Office it is clear that those accusations were groundless.¹⁰

During the last days of October the Secretary of State had among its top priorities the humanitarian crisis that was happening in Hungary.¹¹ British Red Cross was already active and was operating mostly through Austria, but Government Ministers were also organizing non-party meetings in order to raise money for medical aid for Hungary.¹²

During the 2nd November we could follow big diplomatic offensive of the US diplomats backed by British and French partners in the UN. As after intelligence report confirmed that Imre Nagy is willing to shift his alliance with West.¹³ Sir Dixon, British representative in the UN, had faith in his plan that could see Soviets isolated in the Security Council and that could later lead only to the acceptance of the resolution on the situation in Hungary in the General Assembly.¹⁴ Still, British diplomat thought that there were very slim chances that Soviets would not seek to go into reverse in Hungary. One of the few benefits of that could be improving

9 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 New York 29th October 1956 Sir P. Dixon to Foreign office.

10 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 New York 29th October 1956 Sir P. Dixon to Foreign office.

11 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 29th October 1956 Sir J. Ward, a statement of the Deputy Secretary of State.

12 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 30th October 1956 Thomas Brimelow, a statement of the Secretary of State.

13 Fresh reports that the British were getting not only from Budapest but also from Vienna were in favor of that. British representative from Vienna consulted the Foreign office that this was the great moment for joint action that will make Hungarians independent of Soviet influence. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Vienna 2nd November 1956 sir G. Wallinger to Foreign Office.

14 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 New York 2nd November 1956 Sir P. Dixon to Foreign office.

situation in Suez, for that kind of actions would make ridiculous very strong position which the Soviet Government was taking regarding Suez.¹⁵

Imre Nagy's declaration of neutrality of Hungary came in the very turbulent time when the Soviet troops were pouring in Hungary. Although he addressed the Secretary General of the United Nations and asked for the protection of the Hungarian neutrality, not much could have been done as there was no will among great Western powers to confront the Soviets.

British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Hayter, concluded that Soviets might also use pretext of anarchy to step in Hungary and that they might be well tempted to set up a Communist Government and "accede to its request" for support in restoring order.¹⁶ According to his reports Soviet leadership was already preparing for the offensive in Hungary. Khrushchev was "at home" for a few days during that period and no foreign diplomats could meet him.¹⁷

At the same time the situation in Budapest was calmer than at the end of the October, but still the Soviets were making moves that suggested the upcoming storm. The railway lines in the northeast of the Hungary were occupied by the Soviet troops, same as the railway station at Nyiregyhasa, at least two airfields in the southern cities of Szeged and Kecskemet, were also in Soviet hands.¹⁸ Moves of the Soviet troops in Austria that were getting closer to the Hungarian borders were also additional proof of attack that would follow.¹⁹

On November 3rd, as Soviet troops were ready to pass into Hungary from the direction of Vienna, a minor accident happened when they opened fire on the column of the refugees that also included a Swedish Red Cross vehicle. That was quite a jittery reaction of the Soviet troops.²⁰

15 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Moscow 2nd November 1956 Sir W. Hayter to Foreign office.

16 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Moscow 2nd November 1956 Sir W. Hayter to Foreign office.

17 Sir Hayter reported to Foreign Office that his American colleague got very lame answer from the Bulgarian ambassador if the Soviets were planning the attack, he understood that the Soviets will strike soon. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Moscow 2nd November 1956 Sir W. Hayter to Foreign office.

18 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 2nd November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.

19 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 2nd November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.

20 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 3rd November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.

Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who announced the new coalition government via radio on 3rd November, was trying to get the Secretary General of the United Nations to visit Hungary as soon as possible. One of the options was that he could even fly to New York to try to urge him to come.²¹ British intelligence didn't have any other information about other reasons of his possible trip from Budapest and Hungary.

In the early morning of 4th November heavy fighting broke out. On that day the Soviet troops attacked Budapest. According to the British sources, Soviet troops progressed very swiftly after penetrating and occupying the most important city buildings including the Parliament, but still were not in the complete control of the city. Members of the freshly elected Hungarian government were not very optimistic about their destiny, but were strongly convinced that reestablishment of the Communism in Hungary will be very tough task for Khrushchev and his Hungarian aides.²² By the end of day the Soviets were in control of all the bridges and various other points, although fighting continued in the city.²³

The Foreign Office after receiving news of the Soviet invasion urged its representative at the East River to do all he could in order to obtain a condemnation of Soviet actions and recommendation of calling for immediate cease-fire and resumption of negotiations about withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and recognition of Hungarian neutrality.²⁴ Sir Dixon got clear instructions to condemn evident Soviet plan to impose by force new puppet Government.

Soviet operation named "Whirlwind" was even more efficient as the leaders of the Revolution didn't have a clear position of how to react to Soviet invasions. Two opposing attitudes can be followed through reactions of the Prime Minister Imre Nagy and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee for Public Safety and commander of the National Guard Mayor General Bela Kiraly. While Imre

21 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 3rd November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.

22 Those information British got in their embassy in Budapest though the Hungarian Minister of State Mr. Jozsef Fischer. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 4th November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.

23 Through the Austrian Red Cross intelligence from the ground the British embassy staff heard that there are hundreds of Hungarian casualties lying in the streets. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 Budapest 5th November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office and Whitehall.

24 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/122380 London 4th November 1956 Mr. Fry to Foreign office to New York.

Nagy had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, accepting the offer of asylum that proved to be insincere and that doomed him after the Soviets took over the country, Bela Kiraly continued with resistance. His actions frustrated the Soviets as they were aware that he was an excellent soldier and capable organizer. Still, he lost the battle at Nagykovacsi, but managed to escape on 10th November westward to the Bakony mountains and he crossed to Austria in late November (Horvath 2006, 458).

The grimmest expectations came true as the Soviet response was very effective and the crush of the Imre Nagy and his short-lived Government was complete. British and French got stuck in Suez where the defeated Egyptian managed to get the upper hand after the joint Anglo-French forces withdrew and left space for the United Nations force to come in. The British and French focus was away from Hungary in the weeks after the Soviets crushed Imre Nagy's side.

In December and January 1957 Foreign office shared the same frustration as their French colleagues with indolence of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. French thought that he did very little to make any of General Assembly Resolutions concerning Hungary work. Their view was that Hungary, although Soviets were there in full power, should not be forgotten. French informed Foreign Office that the State Department was not in favor of French initiative and thought that any actions of Dag Hammarskjöld were bound to fail. Their attitude was that it would be more useful if individual Governments keep Hungary in the public eye by organizing a flow of resolutions and petitions from public organizations, trade unions etc.²⁵

The French referred to four resolutions passed by the General Assembly from November 4th till December 12th.²⁶ The resolutions didn't prove to benefit

25 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 London 6th April 1957 Thomas Brimelow to New York.

26 The resolutions referred to in the attached French telegram were: (a) November 4th: Called upon the Government of the USSR to desist from any intervention and to withdraw its forces; reaffirmed the right of the Hungarian people to its own Government; requested the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary, to observe this situation through representatives named by him and to report thereon to the General Assembly; and to suggest methods to bring to an end foreign intervention in Hungary; and call upon the Secretary General to inquire into and report to the General Assembly on the Hungarian need for food, medicine and other similar supplies; (b) November 9th: Reaffirmed the previous request to the Secretary General to investigate through representatives named by him and to report to the General Assembly; (c) November 21st: Requested the Secretary General and

Hungarians as the Soviets were firmly in control of the situation on the ground. Even though Secretary General set up ad hoc special committee for the Hungary on 10th January 1957, after the General Assembly passed the resolution on 10th January there were no doubts for French that the Soviets and the puppet Hungarian Government would prevent them from taking any effective action. French were still of the opinion that they could achieve most if they waited for the report of the Special committee, as that report could have proved the best basis for the publicity of the situation in Hungary. They were also afraid that the Soviets would veto any further actions in the Security Council. The Foreign Office agreed with French that the Secretary General should visit both Budapest and Moscow as soon as possible, it also agreed with other conclusions of their French colleagues and stressed that the North Atlantic Council should have a common position towards the situation in Hungary.²⁷

Although initiatives in the United Nations actually didn't help much, they were still quite frustrating for the Soviets and Kadar's Government. The joint declaration of the two Governments published in *Pravda* on 29th March 1957 is a good example:

The facts show that the ruling circles of the Western powers, who bear heavy responsibility for the bloody events in Hungary, do not at present wish to cease their activity, which is aimed at intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary and of the other countries of the Socialist camp. This is shown in particular, by the fact that the so-called Hungarian question was brought up for discussion in U.N.O. A shameful role at the session of the General Assembly of U.N.O. was played by the representatives of the imperialists powers who, in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, tried to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungarian question, doing their best to keep it artificially on the ground. Both Governments declare that the rising and discussion of this question in the U.N.O. and the adoption of a resolution on this question by the General Assembly seriously undermine the prestige of that

the High Commissioner for Refugees to continue their efforts to meet the needs of Hungarian refugees; (d) December 12th: Requested the Secretary General to take any initiative that he deemed helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem in conformity with principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 London 6th April 1957 Thomas Brimelow to New York.

27 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 London 8th April 1957 Thomas Brimelow to New York.

*organization and constitute a gross intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary as well as in questions which are within the competence of the Government of the USSR, Hungary and the other states of the Warsaw Pact.*²⁸

The Foreign Office was having detailed reports on repression in Hungary by the Kadar's regime that was using judicial and police machines for the campaign of the repression contrary to the human rights and when the Soviets were trying to consolidate the position of their troops in Hungary through the negotiations of a military agreement with the authorities which they themselves have put into power in that country. British diplomats had no special expectations of the Secretary General's visit to Hungary but were aware it was important not to allow attempts of forgetting the Hungarian affair, something that Moscow and Budapest wished.

Reports from the British embassy in Budapest from late winter and spring gave a clear picture of growing influences of "Rakosists" party members that started to take up influential posts. That trend started in 1957 after they started to get back to Hungary from their previous appointments in Soviet service.²⁹ British reports also gave a look of the everyday persecutions that were happening all over Hungary and to different social groups. Targets were in most of the cases heavily beaten and would have difficulties to have treatment in ambulances as they were marked as state enemies. If they wanted any help they had to lie and to state they injured themselves.³⁰

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Thanks to the insight into material of the FO, a conclusion can be made what was position of Great Britain regarding revolution in Hungary, and what were conclusions apropos behavior of the Soviets. The Suez crisis was much more important not only to Great Britain, but also to France and USA, than revolution taking place in the center of Europe. Still, despite impossibility to oppose Soviet invasion, it is obvious that all three big Western powers tried to maximally use all possibilities that United Nations Organization offered in order to oppose Soviets

28 The translation of the article from *Pravda* was part of the report. The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 London 8th April 1957 Thomas Brimelow to New York.

29 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 Budapest 11th April 1957 to Foreign Office.

30 The National Archives, Foreign Office 371/128676 Budapest 12th April 1957 to Foreign Office.

and Kadar's regime that Soviets imposed in Budapest after the break of revolution. British reports are focused on humanitarian catastrophe they closely watched from the very beginning of turmoil in October 1956, while after the collapse of the Revolution they were watching the issue of Hungarian refugees as well (Kovacevic 2003, 99–101); also, they were very focused on permanent reprisal suffered by Hungarian citizens. The sources made it clear that the FO precisely analyzed Soviet wishes to impose 'limited sovereignty' on their allies in Warsaw pact. But yet, the correspondence used in this paper does not give impression that London developed strategy to oppose Soviet interfering in Eastern European any way. It might be that attention to problems in the Near East had certain impact, or maybe answer is to be found in other fonds of national archives. Still, events in Hungary in 1956 encouraged USSR for further reactions to challenges in the Eastern camp (Cvetkovic 2013, 377–379). The first war between two socialist states in Europe and victory of aggressor with no consequences was an indicator that showed how Soviets could react in future disputes with rebellious satellites. At that time, America was more occupied with the Suez crisis, and its attitude towards Eastern bloc countries could be summed up to: "we do not look upon these nations as potential military allies". Such attitudes at first surprised and afterwards encouraged bold and interventionist policy of the Soviets. One of consequences of 1956 Revolution was strengthening of the role of NATO among Western allies who increasingly wanted their joint position to be constructed within consensus frame of NATO pact, and decreasing influence of UNO, for despite several resolutions it didn't manage to provide efficient answer to challenges of Hungarian revolution of 1956.

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Britanski pogled na Mađarsku revoluciju 1956.

Izbijanje Revolucije u Mađarskoj iznenadilo je Zapadne sile, kao i Sovjetski Savez. Razvoj događaja koji je tekao drugačije u odnosu na Poljsku doveo je do otvorene borbe protiv Sovjeta i napuštanja Varšavskog pakta nakon uspešnog početka revolucije i formiranja vlade Imre Nađa. Britanska i francuska pažnja, kao i američka bili su okupirani Sueckom krizom. Pored toga u izjavama zvaničnika tri najveće zapadne sile Sovjetima je stavljeno do znanja da se oni neće mešati u unutrašnja pitanja Mađarske. Izveštaji koji su korišćeni u ovom radu, iz fonda Foreign Office-a iz Nacionalnog arhiva u Londonu pružaju jasnu sliku o tome šta je britanskim diplomatama i državnici bilo najvažnije u vezi sa događajima od oktobra do početka 1957. Na osnovu neobjavljenih izvora i

korespondencije iz Budimpešte, Beča, Njujorka, Moskve i Londona zaključuje se da je pored humanitarne katastrofe koja je zadesila Mađarsku važno i pitanje progona političkih neistomišljenika i državnih neprijatelja nakon uspostavljanja Kadarove vlade. Uticaj NATO-a kao krovne organizacije za zapadne saveznike je porastao tokom i nakon Mađarske revolucije. U okviru te organizacije su od novembra donosili konsenzus o daljim koracima u vezi sa izazovima u Istočnoj Evropi. Suprotno tome, Organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija i pored nekoliko rezolucija koje su osuđivale sovjetsku agresiju, nisu uspele da izvrše bilo kakav značajniji uticaj ni na Sovjete, ni na Kadarovu vladu, što je veoma frustriralo britanske i francuske zvaničnike.

Ključne reči: Mađarska revolucija, Britanci, 1956, Ujedinjene nacije, Foreign Office

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